1 Auction formats

In this section I will describe the four basic auction formats that we will discuss. The description will include the process by which bids are submitted and the assignment rule for the winner. For now, consider only the cases where we have a single, indivisible unit for sale.

1.1 1st-price sealed bid auction

Process All bidders submit a bid on a piece of paper to the auctioneer.

Assignment rule The highest bidder is awarded the object. The price that the high bidder pays is equal to his bid.

Examples Many procurement auctions are 1st-price sealed bid. Procurement auctions are typically run by the government to auction off a construction job (such as paving a stretch of highway).

1.2 Dutch Auction

Process There is a countdown clock that starts at the top of the value distribution and counts backwards. Thus, the price comes down as seconds tick off the clock. When a bidder wishes to stop the auction he or she yells, “stop”.

Assignment rule The bidder who called out stop wins the auction, and the bidder pays the last price announced by the auctioneer.

Examples The Aalsmeer flower auction, in the Netherlands, is an example of this type of auction. Hmmm, wonder where the phrase “Dutch” auction comes from...

By the way, the Ebay dutch auctions are NOT, NOT, NOT Dutch auctions. They are multi-unit ascending $k + 1$ price auctions. Perhaps we will discuss those later.

1.3 2nd-price sealed bid auction

Process Bidders submit their bids on a piece of paper to the auctioneer.

Assignment rule The highest bidder wins, but the price that the highest bidder pays is equal to the 2nd highest bid. Hence the term 2nd-price auction.
**Examples**  Ebay is kind of a warped 2nd-price auction. If you think about the very last seconds of an Ebay auction (or if you consider that every person only submits one bid), think about what happens. You are sending in a bid. If you have the highest bid you will win. You will pay an amount equal to the 2nd highest bid plus some small increment. Thus if you submit a bid of $10 and the second highest bid is $4, you pay $4 plus whatever the minimum is (I think it’s a quarter). So you would pay $4.25.

There are other reasons to think that ebay is not actually a 2nd-price auction — perhaps we will discuss them in class or on a homework.

1.4 Ascending clock auction

**Process**  A clock starts at the bottom of the value distribution. As the clock ticks upward, the price of the item rises with the clock. This is truly supposed to be a continuous process, but it is very difficult to count continuously, so we will focus on one tick of the clock moving the price up one unit. If you like we can consider the unit to be a penny, or we can consider a unit to be the smallest denomination of the most worthless currency on the planet (those of you who know me know that I have very little background in international economics — therefore, I leave it up to you to decide the most worthless currency). The idea is that this is the smallest amount that anyone could possibly bid — that is how the ticks on the clock move the price up. All bidders are considered in the auction (either they are all standing or they all have their hands on a button — some mechanism to show that they are in). When the price reaches a level at which the bidder no longer wishes to purchase the object, the bidder drops out of the auction (sits down or releases the button). Bidders cannot reenter the auction. Eventually only two bidders will remain. When the next to last bidder drops out, the last bidder wins.

**Assignment rule**  The winning bidder is the last bidder left in the auction. The bidder pays a price equal to the last price on the clock.

**Examples**  The typical example given is Japanese fish markets. I’m trying to find a specific reference, but I have recently been told that the Japanese fish market story may be an urban legend. Thus, the English clock auction may only be a theoretical construct.

2 Bidding strategies

The previous section is meant to introduce you to the auction formats. In this section we will discuss the NE bidding strategies. In some cases we will “derive” the NE strategies, while in others I will discuss the intuition behind the NE and leave the gory details to those interested.¹

¹Wolfstettar, Elmar (1999) *Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives* is an excellent reference for such gory details.
2.1 General Environment

Before discussing the bidding strategies we need to set up the general environment. This suggests that if the environment (or pieces of it) change, the NE bidding strategies will change.

The general name for the environment is the Symmetric Independent Private Values environment (SIPV) with Risk-neutral bidders. We will also assume that we are auctioning off a single, indivisible unit of the good.

1. There needs to be a probability distribution for player values, denoted \( v_i \). We will assume that all player values are drawn from the uniform distribution on the unit interval. This means that all values are drawn from the interval \([0, 1]\) with equal probability. More importantly, if you draw a value of 0.7, then the probability that someone else drew a value less than you is also 0.7. Since probabilities must add up to 1, and since the other player’s value draw must either be greater than your value or less than your value. We will not allow for the fact that someone else could draw the exact same value (theoretically, ties cannot occur with positive probability in a continuous probability distribution). This means that the probability that the other player has a value greater than yours is \( 1 - 0.7 = 0.3 \).

2. The setting is symmetric in the sense that all players know that the other player’s value(s) is drawn from the same probability distribution.

3. The setting is independent in the sense that your value draw has NO impact on the value draw of the other player(s).

4. The setting is private in the sense that only you know your value – thus, it is private information.

5. We add the fact that our bidders are risk-neutral, as risk aversion will alter some results. Thus, our utility function will be:

\[
u (x) = \begin{cases} x & \text{if win the auction} \\ 0 & \text{if don’t win} \end{cases}
\]

The term \( x \) in the utility function can typically that of as \( v_i - b_i \), where \( v_i \) is the player \( i \)'s value and \( b_i \) is player \( i \)'s bid.

This should lead you to our first bidding rule (in this particular environment).

1. Do NOT overbid, where overbidding is defined as the act of placing a bid greater than your value. Overbidding is weakly dominated by not bidding.
2.1.1 Ascending clock auction – bidding strategy

Consider the following example. You have a value of 10. The clock begins at 0 and ticks upward: 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, ... The question is, when should you sit down (or drop out of the auction)? Consider three possible cases:

1. The clock reaches 11:
   In this case you should drop out. While you increase your chances of winning the item by staying in, note that you will end up paying more than the item is worth to you. You can do better than this by dropping out of the auction and receiving a surplus of zero. So, as soon as the price on the clock exceeds your value you should drop out.

2. The clock is at some price less than 10:
   In this case you should remain in the auction. If you drop out you will receive 0 surplus. However, if you remain in the auction then you could win a positive surplus. If you drop out before your value is reached you are essentially giving up the chance to earn a positive surplus. Since this positive surplus is greater than the 0 surplus you would receive if you dropped out, you should stay in the auction.

3. The clock is at 10:
   What happens when the price on the clock reaches your value? Well, if you win the auction you get 0 surplus and if you drop out you get 0 surplus, so regardless of what you do you get 0 surplus. We will say that you stay in at 10, and drop out at 11. For one thing, it makes the NE bidding strategy simple – stay in until your value is reached, then drop out. Another way to motivate this is to consider that peoples values are drawn from the range of numbers $[0.01, 1.01, 2.01, 3.01, ...]$ instead of $[0, 1, 2, 3, ...]$. However, assume the prices increase as $[0, 1, 2, 3, ...]$. It is clear that if you have a value of 3.01 you should be in at 3, while if you have a value of 3.01 you should be out at 4. This is the “add a small amount to your value” approach that I mentioned in class.

So what is the NE strategy? Stay in until your value is reached and drop out as soon as it is passed by the clock.

2.1.2 2\textsuperscript{nd}-price sealed bid auction – bidding strategy

In this auction you submit a bid and pay a price equal to that of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} highest bid. How should you bid?

One method of finding a NE (or a solution in general) is to propose that a strategy is a NE and then verify it. Naturally, it is a good idea to propose the right strategy the first time. So, consider the strategy: submit your value. Is this a good strategy?

What else could we do? We could submit a bid greater than the value or less than the value. Let’s examine each of these.
**Bid above your value**  Suppose we submit a bid above our value. What could this possibly change? Well, if we were to win when submitting our value then absolutely nothing changes – we still pay the same price since the price (if we win) is not tied to our bid. What happens if we submit a bid greater than our value and this causes us to switch from losing the auction to winning the auction? Suppose our value is 10 and the other player’s value is 12. The other player submits 12 and we submit 10. We lose and earn 0 surplus. Now suppose we were to bid 13. We win, which is good, but we have to pay 12 for something that is only worth 10 to us. So we earn a surplus of (−2). This is bad. We could have done better by placing a bid of 10 (our value) and earning 0. So placing a bid equal to our value is better than placing a bid above the value in this case.

**Bid below your value**  Suppose we submit a bid below our value. What could this possibly change? Well, if we were going to lose by submitting our value, then we still lose when submitting a bid below the value. So this changes nothing (at least not for us – it would help the highest bidder if we were the 2nd highest bid!) as we still receive 0 surplus. Suppose we lower our bid and still win – again nothing changes because the 2nd highest bidder has still submitted the same bid. It is possible though that we lower our bid and lose – here’s where the problem occurs. Suppose our value is 15 and the other value is 9. We submit a bid of 15, we win, and we get a surplus of (15 − 9) = 6. We submit a bid of 14, we still get a surplus of 6. Now suppose we submit a bid of 8 – we go from getting a surplus of 6 to getting a surplus of 0. It would be much better to submit a bid equal to your value and get a surplus of 6. So placing a bid equal to our value is at least as good in most cases and strictly better in some cases.

We have now determined that submitting a bid equal to our value is at least as good as submitting a bid greater than or lower than the value in some cases, and strictly better in other cases. Therefore, submitting a bid equal to your value is a weakly dominant strategy.

NE for 2nd-price auction: Submit a bid equal to your value.

You should note that the 2nd-price sealed bid auction and the ascending clock auction are strategically equivalent. This means that all players have the same bidding strategies in either auction, even though the mechanism that produces the winner of the auction is slightly different.

### 2.1.3 1st-price sealed bid auction – bidding strategy

In this auction you pay an amount equal to your bid if you win. The first question is, should you submit a bid equal to your value?

**Bid equal to your value**  If you submit a bid equal to your value then you will expect to earn 0 surplus. If you win, then you will have to pay an amount equal to your value and if you lose you receive nothing. It stands to reason that
you may be able to do better than this by submitting a bid below your value. The question is how far below your value?

**Bid equal to the lowest possible value** If you submit a bid equal to the lowest possible value that could be drawn then you will also receive 0 surplus. The reason is that you will never win because your bid was so low. Taken together with the fact that you will bid below your value, this means your actual bid should fall between the lowest possible value and your value draw.

**Actual problem** The actual problem facing someone bidding in a 1st-price sealed bid auction is to maximize their expected utility. Their expected utility can be written as:

\[
E[1^{st}\text{-price auction}] = \Pr(\text{win}) \times (v_i - b_i) + \Pr(\text{lose}) \times 0
\]

Since the term \(\Pr(\text{lose}) \times 0 = 0\), we can drop that from the equation to get:

\[
E[1^{st}\text{-price auction}] = \Pr(\text{win}) \times (v_i - b_i)
\]

If you have taken a course like math econ, then this is a maximization problem, where the choice variable is \(b_i\). You should note that the larger \(b_i\) is the greater the probability of winning will be, but the larger \(b_i\) is then the lower the surplus will be if you win.

The idea is to pick the bid that maximizes this function. The general bidding strategy, for \(N\) bidders in the SIPV-RN environment,\(^2\) is to bid \(\frac{N-1}{N}v_i\). Thus you are shaving your bid depending on how many other bidders there are. The more bidders, the less you shave your bid.

**2.1.4 Dutch auction – bidding strategy**

Recall that with a Dutch auction the bidder watches as the clock descends, and then calls out when he sees a price that he wishes to pay. The problem facing the bidder is to maximize their expected utility. Their expected utility can be written as:

\[
E[1^{st}\text{-price auction}] = \Pr(\text{win}) \times (v_i - b_i) + \Pr(\text{lose}) \times 0
\]

Notice that this is the same problem faced in the first price auction. This suggests that the 1st-price and the Dutch auctions are strategically equivalent. Thus, the bidding strategy in the Dutch auction is to yell out stop when the clock reaches \(\frac{N-1}{N}\) of your value.

\(^2\)Note that if the assumptions about the environment are changed then the NE bidding strategy may (likely will) change.
3 Which format is “better”?

Now that we have seen the different formats, the question turns to which one is better. Better can mean 2 things. From the standpoint of a benevolent social planner, better could mean more efficient. We will say that an auction is efficient if the item goes to the person with the highest value. Of course, an individual seller does not necessarily care about social goals such as efficiency, but about the revenue that the auction will generate for himself. The relevant question for the individual seller is then which format generates more revenue. We will look at both of these notions of “better”.

3.1 Efficiency

We will define the level of efficiency in an auction as $\frac{V_w}{V_H}$, where $V_w$ is the value of the winning bidder and $V_H$ is the value of the high bidder. Note that if the winner is the high bidder, then efficiency is 1 or 100%. The question is, in all of our auction formats will the bidder with the highest value bid more than, less than, or an amount equal to bidders with lower values. It is easy to see that in an ascending clock or 2nd-price sealed bid auction that higher values lead to higher bids because bidders simply submit their values as bids. In the Dutch and 1st-price auctions, the bid function is $b_i = \frac{N-1}{N} v_i$. The question is, who will submit the highest bid? It should be fairly easy to see that higher values will submit higher bids. Technically, we can say that the bid function is increasing in the value draw – as the value draw increases, the bid increases. Thus, bidders with higher values will submit higher bids, and the bidder with the highest value will submit the highest bid. These auctions will also be 100% efficient, assuming that all of our conditions hold and bidders use the NE bidding strategies.

3.2 Revenue

As far as revenue goes we know that the 1st-price and Dutch auctions are strategically equivalent and that the ascending clock auction and the 2nd-price are strategically equivalent. Thus we know that the revenue from the 1st-price and Dutch will be equal and the revenue from the ascending clock auction and the 2nd-price will be equal. The question is, does the 1st-price generate more revenue than the 2nd-price?

Let $V_1$ be the highest value and $V_2$ be the second highest value. Then the expected revenue of the 1st-price auction is:

$$Revenue\ (1^{st}\ -\ price) = \frac{N - 1}{N} E[V_1]$$

The expected revenue of the 2nd-price auction is:

$$Revenue\ (2^{nd}\ -\ price) = E[V_2]$$
We will assume that there are the same number of bidders in each auction. We now need to know what $E[V_1]$ and $E[V_2]$ are in order to answer which of the auctions will generate more revenue. To do this we use the concept of an order statistic – basically, an order statistic tells us what the expected value of the $k^{th}$ highest draw from a distribution will be given that we make $N$ draws from the distribution. In our case, we are using the uniform distribution over the range 0 to 1. We find that the $k^{th}$ highest value will be equal to:

$$\frac{N - k - 1}{N + 1}$$

So:

$$E[V_1] = \frac{N}{N + 1}$$

$$E[V_2] = \frac{N - 1}{N + 1}$$

This means that the expected revenue from the 1st-price auction is equal to $\frac{N-1}{N+1}$ and the expected revenue from the 2nd-price auction is also equal to $\frac{N-1}{N+1}$. Thus, both auction formats are expected to generate the same revenue.

While that may surprise some of you, we have a more powerful result called the revenue equivalence theorem. Essentially, if the conditions of the theorem (laid out below) are met, then any mechanism designed will lead to the same expected revenue.

### 3.2.1 Revenue Equivalence Theorem

Assume our set-up – SIPV with $N$ risk-neutral agents. Values are drawn from a distribution $F(v)$ that is strictly increasing and atomless on $[0, 1]$. Suppose no buyer wants more than 1 of $k$ identical, indivisible objects for sale.

Any mechanism in which:

1. Objects always go to the $k$ buyers with the highest values
2. any buyer with value $v = v$ expects 0 surplus

yields the same expected revenue and results in a buyer with value $v$ making the same expected payment.

This is a very powerful result that extends beyond the scope of auctions, as you should see on the homework.

### 4 Breaking revenue equivalence and efficiency

If all formats are perfectly efficient and generate the same revenue in expectation, why do auctioneers prefer one type or the other? In the sections below we will look at how to “break” the results from above.
4.1 Breaking revenue equivalence

Suppose that instead of risk-neutral agents we had risk-averse agents. They still have the exact same problem as before – they want to maximize their expected surplus. In the 2nd-price and ascending clock auctions, there was no “maximization” problem – bidders simply submitted their bids or dropped out when the clock reached their value. Thus, the strategy should not change in these types of auctions if bidders are risk averse since they can do no better following another strategy. Since the strategy does not change the expected revenue from the 2nd-price auction is still the same.

Consider the 1st-price auction. Bidders wanted to maximize their expected surplus, given by:

$$E[1^{st} \text{ price}] = \Pr(\text{win}) \times (v_i - b_i)$$

However, in the risk averse case bidders want to maximize something like:

$$E[1^{st} \text{ price}] = \Pr(\text{win}) \times \sqrt{(v_i - b_i)}$$

Recall that in the risk-neutral version of the 1st-price auction the bidder bid $\frac{1}{2}$ of his value. In this risk averse case, the bidder will bid $\frac{2}{3}$ of his value. Thus, we can see that the bidder is going to bid more in the risk averse case. Intuitively, if the bidder were to bid $\frac{1}{2}$ of his value in the risk averse case the marginal benefit from increasing the bid (the increase in the probability of winning) would be greater than the marginal cost (the amount of surplus lost). So we increase the bid until the marginal benefit of increasing the bid equals the marginal cost, just like we do with many other applications in economics.

4.2 Breaking efficiency

Suppose we want to break efficiency. The true version of the ascending clock auction has the price moving up continuously with the tick of the clock. However, we know that people do not have continuous values, or, even if they do, there is some rational minimum amount by which their values must increase. In the US the smallest value one can have for a good is a penny, so it is not a stretch to think that the smallest unit in which values can be denominated is a penny. If this is a case, then a clock which moves at the rate of 1 penny per second (or 1 penny per hour or 1 penny per half-second – the rate is not important, but the units that it counts are) will still be perfectly efficient in the sense that the highest valued bidder will get the object. However, consider a clock that increases the price at a rate of 1 penny per second. Now consider the following prices and the corresponding amount of time it will take to auction off objects of these values:

- $10 – 16.67$ minutes
- $1 \text{ million} – 3.17$ years
- $1 \text{ billion} – 3170$ years
It doesn’t really seem “efficient” to take 3170 years to auction off an item. In fact, it seems quite inefficient. So what auctioneers will typically do is impose a minimum bid increment. This minimum bid increment is the minimum amount by which the clock will increase (or the minimum amount by which bidders must increase the bid if they wish to place a new bid). While this speeds up the process, the introduction of the minimum increment can also destroy the efficiency results of auctions. For instance, suppose 2 players have values of $14.08 and $14.92 respectively. If the clock ticks up at $1 per second, then both bidders will drop out at $14. In this case, a tie is declared and we must use the tie-breaking mechanism. The tie-breaking mechanism is usually a coin flip or some other equal probability game. Thus, on average, the bidder with a value of $14.08 will get the item half of the time. As you can see, the minimum increment introduces the possibility of inefficiency into the auction process.